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moderation but the well-established result from the wage bargaining literature that a
revenue-neutral increase in the degree of tax progression is good for employment
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effort. While it remains true that introducing tax progression increases employment,
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11. Introduction
Tax progression leads to wage moderation and is thus good for employment. This result
has been derived for different assumptions about the wage setting motives such as rent
sharing in wage bargaining models (see e.g. Holm and Koskela 1996, Koskela and
Vilmunen 1996, Koskela and Schöb 1999) or effort incentives in efficiency wage models,
where firms unilaterally decide both upon the wage rate and the employment level (see
e.g. Pisauro 1991, Rasmussen 2002).
The effect of tax progression, however, has not yet been analyzed in a framework
that combines these different wage setting motives in a uniform framework. So far only
very few papers combine wage bargaining and effort considerations at all. Early
contributions by Lindbeck and Snower (1991), Sanfey (1993) do not provide a uniform
answer to the question in how far different wage setting motives analyzed in efficiency
wage and union bargaining models reinforce or weaken each other. Later on, Bulkley and
Myles (1996) show that with imperfect monitoring of workers’ effort, a monopoly trade
unions will set a higher wage than the pure efficiency wage set by the firms. This
provides a higher bonus for non-shirking and results in a higher level of effort than we
would observe in a competitive labor market. Garino and Martin (2000), on the other
side, show that efficiency wages offset the cost of higher wages and thus induce firms to
make more concessions in wage negotiations. Thus there is theoretical evidence that the
different wage setting motives reinforce each other.
Within such a framework, Altenburg and Straub (1998) analyzes variations of the
benefit-replacement ratio. They find that in contrast to the standard result in both
efficiency wage and union bargaining models, the effect of a higher reservation utility on
wages, employment and effort is ambiguous when benefits are financed through lump-
sum taxes. A higher replacement ratio may then reduce the wage rate and raise
employment. A higher reservation utility of workers will induce firms to reduce their
2demand for effective labor. If, as a consequence, the labor share decreases firms
experience a higher relative reduction in profits from a wage increase. This explains why
the wage may actually fall and – in the end – employment will rise.
To our knowledge, only one paper analyzes the impact of taxes in this framework.
Garcia and Rios (2004) adopt the Altenburg and Straub (2002) model to analyze revenue-
neutral tax reforms numerically. There numerical calculations suggest that a revenue-
neutral increase in the tax exemption financed by an increase in the wage tax increases
employment. That indicates that the result by Koskela and Schöb (1999) according to
which a revenue-neutral shift from payroll taxes to wage taxes raises employment when
there is a higher tax exemption for wage taxes also applies when effort is unobservable.
Furthermore, they argue that it is better for employment in the case of constant fiscal
revenues to compensate higher tax exemption through increases in wage taxes rather than
payroll taxes. Since Garcia and Rios (2004) only provide numerical rather than analytical
results, we present an analytical framework to elaborate the way in which tax policy
affects wage negotiations and employment when effort is only imperfectly observable and
trade unions and firms negotiate on wages.
Our comparative statics analysis indicates that the standard results from the trade
union literature must be modified in the case of imperfect monitoring of individual effort
determination. In these standard models, tax policy only affects wages by altering the size
of the labor surplus. When both wage setting motives are present, however, tax policy
also affects the strength by which tax policy parameters affect the negotiated wage and
employment. When effort is not observable, tax policy affects the wage elasticity of
effort, which in turn affects the wage elasticity of labor demand. Since these alter the
scope by which workers can attract labor rents, this constitutes an additional channel by
which tax policy can influence the wage negotiation. As it turns out, this additional
impact reinforces the effects of partial tax policy measures that we observe in the
standard bargaining and efficiency models.
3Table 1: Labour taxation in the OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Averagewage tax
Marginal
wage tax
average wage
tax rate
progression
ARP
Calculated
relative tax
exemption
a/w
Australia 28.6 35.4 6.8 22.9
Austria 44.9 55.5 10.6 56.1
Belgium 54.2 66.4 12.2 34.8
Canada 32.3 33.9 1.6 26.4
Czech Republic 43.6 48.1 4.5 34.9
Denmark 41.5 49.2 7.7 20.7
Finland 43.8 55.1 11.3 36.6
France 47.4 66.6 19.2 30.3
Germany 50.7 64.0 13.3 44.9
Greece 34.9 44.2 9.3 95.2
Hungary 45.8 54.7 8.9 52.3
Iceland 29.7 40.4 10.7 30.7
Ireland 23.8 33.2 9.4 49.5
Italy 45.7 58.0 12.3 46.7
Japan 26.6 31.5 4.9 47.8
Korea 16.6 24.8 8.2 80.0
Luxembourg 31.9 45.9 14.0 64.5
Mexico 15.4 23.4 8.0 78.1
Netherlands 43.6 50.7 7.1 56.6
New Zealand 20.7 33.0 12.3 37.3
Norway 36.9 43.2 6.3 25.4
Poland 43.1 45.7 2.6 33.7
Portugal 32.6 39.4 6.8 60.0
Slovak Republic 42.0 48.3 6.3 52.1
Spain 38.0 45.5 7.5 43.3
Sweden 48.0 51.7 3.7 17.0
Switzerland 28.8 36.5 7.7 46.7
Turkey 42.7 44.5 1.8 12.5
United Kingdom 31.2 40.6 9.4 35.1
United States 29.6 34.1 4.5 22.5
Source: OECD (2004)
Legend: Tax rates are for the year 2004 for a single person with 100% of average wage,
relative to the gross wage including the social security contributions paid by employees.
Column (3) shows the difference between marginal and average rate of income tax. As an
approximation it is assumed that for each country the tax schedule consists of a tax
exemption and a constant marginal tax rate. The exchange rate between US-Dollar and Euro
was assumed to be unity. Social assistance level does not include housing costs. Numbers of
social assistance are from 2002 taken from OECD (2004), Benefits and Wages, OECD
Indicators.
In the second main part of the paper we then analyze revenue-neutral tax reforms that
change the degree of tax progression and derive the qualitative effects such tax reforms
have on the negotiated wage, individual effort and aggregate employment. Table 1
highlights the importance of such an analysis. All OECD labor tax systems in all OECD
countries are progressive and show significant differences in the degree of tax
progression. We measure tax progression by the difference of marginal and average tax
4rates that are shown in the first and second column.1 This difference, reported in the third
column, is known as the average wage tax progression ARP (see Lambert 2001 and our
section 5). The higher this difference, the more progressive wage taxation is. The highest
difference is for France, with 19.2 percentage points, and the lowest one for Canada, with
only 1.4 percentage points.
Our first main result shows that an increase in wage tax progression always leads to
wage moderation. In this respect our model shows that the wage moderation effect of
higher tax progression that is present in both the efficiency wage model and the
bargaining model carries over to the more general case when both wage setting motives
are at work. The effect on effort and, consequently, on labor demand, however, is
ambiguous. Although it remains true that introducing tax progression raises employment,
it turns out that the claim “tax progression is good for employment” (Koskela and
Vilmunen 1996) only applies for moderate degrees of tax progression.
In the following section 2 we present the basic structure of the model and describe
the time sequence of decisions with respect to wage bargaining, labor demand and
individual effort determination. The workers’ individual effort determination and the
firms’ labor demand are elaborated in section 3. Section 4 uses the Nash bargaining
approach to analyze wage negotiations subject to firms’ labor demand and workers’ effort
determination and presents the essential comparative static results. Section 5 applies the
analysis to revenue-neutral changes in the labor tax structure and explores the effects of
tax progression on the negotiated wage, individual effort and employment. The main
findings are summarized in section 6.
1 To make these figures comparable with our stylized model framework below, we refer all tax rates to the
gross wage including payroll taxes paid by the employer.
52. Basic framework
Concerning the time sequence of decisions we assume that the government behaves as a
Stackelberg leader who fixes the tax parameters in the first stage. To raise revenues, the
government can employ a wage tax t, which is levied on the gross wage minus a tax
exemption a . Thus the tax base for the wage tax t  equals Law )( - , where L  denotes
total employment. In the presence of a positive tax exemption a, the marginal tax rate t
exceeds the average tax rate )1( watt a -º  so that we have a linearly progressive tax
system. The net-of-tax wage workers receive is given by tawtwn +-= )1( . We abstract
from payroll taxes.
At stage 2 firms and trade unions bargain with respect to the gross wage.2 They take
the tax parameters as given and anticipate the consequences the negotiated gross wage
has for labor demand by firms and the resulting net labor income has for individual effort
determination by workers. After the wage negotiations are settled the firms decide at
stage 3 about their labor demand. Since firms cannot perfectly observe effort, the firms
have to anticipate the workers’ individual effort decisions. At the final stage 4 workers
make their individual effort choice.
The time sequence of decisions is summarized in Figure 1. In the subsequent sections
we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward induction.
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
1  stagest
Tax policy
( , )t a
Wage
bargaining ( )w
Labour
demand ( )L
Effort
determination ( )e
2  stagend 3  stagerd 4  stageth
2  Since tax parameters are given from the viewpoint of firms and trade unions, it does not matter whether
they bargain over gross or net-of-tax wages (see Koskela and Schöb 2002).
63. Individual effort determination and labor demand
We start analyzing the 4th stage where workers decide about their working effort, taking
the tax policy, the negotiated wage and aggregate employment as given. Then we analyze
stage 3 where firms determine employment.
3.1.  Individual effort determination
We focus on the choice that a single worker faces when employed by a representative
firm in a static framework. Effort cannot be fully controlled by firms. They can set a
standard effort that we normalize to one. If workers meet this standard their jobs are
secure. If they shirk by providing less effort, however, firms can fire them. The
probability of detection depends positively on monitoring effort. Following Bental and
Demougin (2006), we consider an isoelastic probability function of employment de
where [ ]1;0Îd  denotes the (constant) probability elasticity of effort. The probability of
being laid off is thus de-1 . Assuming a representative risk-neutral worker and applying a
specific utility function V  that is additively separable and quasi-linear, we obtain
(1) beegweV dndw )1()]([ -+-= ,
where b  denotes the workers’ outside option that equals some exogenous unemployment
income, and )(eg  denotes the disutility of effort e as a convex function, i.e.
0)(''),(' >egeg . Working time per worker is fixed and normalized to unity.
For the following it is convenient to define the workers’ surplus as the difference
begws n --º )( . This allows us to rewrite the utility function as bseV dw += , which
split the utility into the expected surplus when working with effort e  and the basic
income b  the household receives in any case. The optimal individual effort level can be
derived from the first-order condition 0)('1 =-= - egesdeV ddwe . The worker chooses an
effort level where the expected utility loss of working harder, which occurs with
probability de  equals the expected utility gain from an increased probability of staying in
7employment and receiving the surplus s. Using the parameterization 1,/)( >qq= qeeg ,
the effort function becomes:
(2) ( ) ( )qqqq -º-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
q+
q
=
111
1
bwAbw
d
de nn .
It is straightforward to show that individual effort is increasing in the net-of-tax wage
rate, and decreasing in the outside option. This implies that we have 0<te , because this
lowers the net-of-tax wage and thus reduces the penalty when caught shirking.
Accordingly we observe 0>we  and 0>ae . In fact, we have at et
awe )( --= , a property
we will employ later on. The wage elasticity of effort is
(3) 0
)(
)1(
>
-q
-
=ºe
bw
tw
e
we
n
w .
The respective partial derivatives with respect to the outside option b, the tax exemption a
and the tax rate t are
(4) 0
)(
)1(
2 <-q
-
-=e
bw
ttw
na ,
(5) 2)(
)(
bw
abw
nt -q
-
=e .
The partial derivatives (4) and (5) depend on effects the respective parameter have on the
net-of-tax wage relative to the income surplus of working. With respect to an increase in
the tax rate, this effect is ambiguous since a rise in the wage tax lowers )1( tw -  but at the
same time raises the effective tax credit ta . A higher tax rate always increases the
difference between the net-of-tax rate in absolute terms, but it may lower the relative
difference, which is decisive for the elasticity, if the tax exemption a is very generous. If
ab = , the wage elasticity of effort is unaffected by t since in this case we have
))(1()( bwtbwn --=- . A higher tax exemption a implies that a wage rate increase has a
lower relative impact on the net-of-tax wage and thus implies a lower wage elasticity of
8effort. Only if ab > , a tax rate increase raises the impact a wage rate increase has on
effort: the higher is t, the stronger is the relative increase of bwn -  due to a wage
increase and thus the relative effect on individual effort.
The direct effect of a change in the tax exemption is unambiguous. An increase in the
tax exemption implies that a marginal wage increase has now a lower relative impact.
3.2. Labor demand
In the 3rd stage of the game, each firm takes the tax parameters and the negotiated wage
as given and decides about the labor demand L  by taking into account how the
representative worker will adjust effort. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate a
decreasing returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function in terms of labor and
effort:
(6) d
-d
-d
d
=
1
)(
1
)( eLeLf , 1>d .
Profit is given by wLeLf -=p )( . Since firms anticipate the effort level, workers will
provide ( 0=eV ), the first order profit maximization condition is weeLfL -==p )('0 .
Using the specification (7) gives the following labor demand function
(7) 1-dd-= ewL .
The partial derivative of labor demand with respect to the tax parameters and the
negotiated wage rate and are
0)1( <-d=
e
eLL tt , 0
)1(
>
-d
=
e
eLL aa ,
0))1(()1(21)1( <d+d-e-=-d+d-= -dd--d-d-
w
LeewewL ww .
Since the wage tax and the tax exemption are levied on workers, they only affect labor
demand via the workers’ individual effort, which depends on the net-of-tax wage rate.
9The wage rate w affects labor demand in two different ways. Note that the standard
assumption that profit decreases in the wage rate implies that the wage elasticity of effort
is smaller than one, i.e. 1<e . For the concave production function (6) the wage elasticity
of labor demand depends on both the technological parameter d  and the wage elasticity
of individual effort e  as defined in (3):
(8) d+d-e=dº- )1(*
L
wLw .
The wage elasticity of labor demand is lower compared to the case where wages do not
affect effort. It now depends negatively on the wage elasticity of effort. For 10 <e£  we
have d£d< *1 . Hence, in the presence of unobservable individual effort determination
the wage elasticity of labor demand depends on the tax structure and thus tax policy. If,
for instance, a tax reform increases the wage elasticity of effort, labor demand would
become less elastic. A wage rise would then be less costly for a trade union since the firm
will then lay off less workers.
The firm’s indirect profit function, which we will use in the next section, can be
obtained by substituting labor demand (7) into the profit function:
(9)
)1(
)(),(
11
11*
-d
=-=p
-dd-
-dd-dd- ewewewfew .
Having analyzed workers’ and firms’ behavior with respect to effort and labor demand
we can now turn to the collective wage bargaining of stage 2.
4. Collective wage bargaining
To derive the negotiated wage we apply the Nash bargaining solution within a ‘right-to-
manage’ model according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firms.
10
The wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of the optimal employment decision by
the firms (8) and the optimal individual effort decision by workers (2).
The trade union maximizes the sum of the workers utility wV , and the utility of the
unemployed. Since those being caught shirking and fired are replaced by unemployed
workers, the expected utility of an unemployed is
(10) ))(()1()1(1 *egw
LN
Leb
LN
LeV nddu -
-
-+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
--= .
While we assume that an single worker who is caught shirking will become and remain
unemployed and receive b , from the viewpoint of the trade union, an unemployed
member will replace a laid off worker with the lay-off probability, which is de-1  times
the employment share. We can rewrite the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade
union as
(11) NbLesLNVLVU uw +=-+= ** )()(ˆ ,
where the first term captures the workers surplus from employment and the second term
captures the exogenously given minimum income for all N members. *L  denotes optimal
employment and *e  optimal effort in the s  term. We denote the relative bargaining
power of the union by b , and that of the firm by )1( b- , and assume that the threat points
of the trade union and the firm are described by NbU =0  and 00 =p , respectively.
Applying the Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties decide on the wage w  in
order to solve
(12) {
b-bp=W
1*
)(
)( UwMax
w
,  s.t. 0=p= LeV ,
where **0 )(ˆ LesUUU =-=  is the bargaining surplus to the trade union by including the
disutility of effort and *p  is the indirect profit, presented in equation (9). The Nash
bargaining solution satisfies the following first-order condition
11
(13) 0)1( *
*
=
p
p
b-+b=W www U
U .
As shown in appendix A, we can solve the first-order condition (13) to find the following
implicit Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate in the presence of individual effort
determination
(14) ú
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ë
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where 1)( <q+dd  and thus 1>M  for 1£e . The negotiated gross wage rate depends
on the exogenous income b  when unemployed, the wage tax t  and the tax exemption a .
Furthermore it also depends on the disutility from providing effort )( *eg  and the term M,
which we can interpret as the mark-up. Apart from exogenous parameters this mark-up
also depends on the wage elasticity of effort.
Before we discuss the general case, we will first briefly discuss several special cases,
which can be analyzed within the framework developed here.
A. Observable effort
When effort is observable and verifiable, it can become part of the wage contract. If the
contract specifies some fixed effort level e , we obtain the standard right-to manage
model of union bargaining where the wage depends on the bargaining power of the trade
union and the (constant) wage elasticity of labor demand in the case of a Cobb-Douglas
production function. Since a constant individual effort e  implies 0=e  and a zero
probability of being caught shirking, 0=d , we have
(15) úû
ù
êë
é
-
-+
ºúû
ù
êë
é
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÷÷
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çç
è
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-d
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=
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0
,
which implies a surplus of =s ( )tabeg -+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-d
b )(
)1(
. From (16) we can easily derive
the special cases of a monopoly union
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and the competitive labor market outcome where unions have no bargaining power and
the gross wage only compensates for the disutility of working
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
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=b==e t
tabegw d 1
)(
0
,
in which case the firm exploit the complete workers’ surplus, i.e. 0=s .
B. Unobservable effort without bargaining
When 0=b , the firm unilaterally sets the wage. From the first-order condition 0* =pw  it
follows immediately that the firm act according to the well-known Solow-condition
(Solow 1979), i.e. we have 1=e  and thus
(16) úû
ù
êë
é
-
-
ºúû
ù
êë
é
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ø
ö
ç
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q
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t
tabw
w 111 0
.
The model therefore also captures the essence of the efficiency models with an mark-up
over the total outside option.
C. Unobservable effort with bargaining: comparative statics
For the general case we have 0)1( >e-  and the mark-up is larger than one when the
trade union has some bargaining power, 0>b . It increases with the relative bargaining
power of the trade union b , and depends negatively on the direct wage elasticity of labor
demand d . The wage rate now depends on several new terms that in addition to the
relative bargaining power, the wage elasticity of labor demand, the exogenous income
and the tax parameters enter the formula: (i) the exogenously given probability of
monitoring workers d , (ii) the indirect effect )( *eg  via effort provision and (iii) the
elasticity of effort determination e . Furthermore, unlike in the case of observable effort,
the exogenous income b  when unemployed, the wage tax rate t , and the tax exemption
a  will also affect the wage rate via the mark-up M .
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The impact of a better monitoring of workers on the negotiated wage is zero as the
wage elasticity of effort is not affected by monitoring. We can thus focus in what follows
on the comparative statics of the tax parameters and the outside option, respectively.
Thereby we will call the term )1/())(( * ttabeg --+  as the total outside option, which
affects the negotiated wage rate.
The tax exemption affects the negotiated wage positively both via the mark-up and
the total outside option as follows (see appendix B)
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with 0)1()('1 1*1 >--e-=D --e teeMgwMM ww . In the Nash bargaining with observable
effort (15), the mark-up is independent of a . With unobservable effort, however, workers
will increase effort when the tax exemption rises. This, cet. par. lowers the mark-up
because a lower wage elasticity of effort implies a higher wage elasticity of labor demand
(see equation (8)). A higher wage then induces less effort, which makes the worker less
productive. As a consequence more layoffs result from a wage increase.
The effect of the wage tax rate can be expressed as follows
(18) {{ 0)1(
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(see Appendix B). The total effect of a higher wage tax rate on the negotiated wage is a
priori ambiguous. When we assume ab ³  both the effect on the mark-up is
unambiguously positive and the effect on the total outside option with the given mark-up.
Hence, tax parameters in our model both with Nash wage bargaining and individual
effort determination affect both via a change of the difference between net-of-tax wage
income and outside option and via a change in the mark up.
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We summarize our new characterization of the negotiated wage under individual
effort determination in
Proposition 1: Unobservable individual effort determination strengthens the
effects tax policy measures have on the negotiated wage, compared to the
case where effort is observable. Decreasing the tax exemption lowers the
negotiated wage. An increase in the wage tax rate increases the negotiated
wage when ab ³ .
We can easily verify that the effects indeed reinforce each other. If we take the partial
derivative of (15), we obtain the comparative statics effect for the standard bargaining
model with
0
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For ab ³  the effects tax parameter changes have on the negotiated wage when effort is
observable are always reinforced when effort is not observable. The partial derivative of
equation (16) with respect to a  shows the same result for the efficiency wage model: the
different wage setting motives thus reinforce the partial tax policy effects on gross wages.
We shall note however that in the case where ab £  and 0)( >-+ abeg  we would
obtain opposite partial effects for changes in the wage tax rate. An increase in the wage
tax will then increase the gross wage when effort is observable but will lower the gross
wage when effort is unobservable.
5. Tax revenue-neutral change in tax progression in terms of
wage formation, employment and individual effort
We are now ready to analyze the impact a revenue-neutral restructuring of the labor tax
structure, i.e. the degree of wage tax progression, has on wage formation, individual
15
effort determination and employment. The effect of wage tax progression, which keeps
the tax revenue [ ]LawtG )( -=  constant, can be written in the following way:
[ ] dwLawttLtLdaLdtawdG w)()(0 -++--== . Recalling the definition of the average
tax as ( )watt a -º 1 , this can be expressed as
(19) dw
t
ttdt
t
awda
a
dG
)()( *
0
d-
+
-
=
=
.
An appropriate and intuitive way to define tax progression is to look at the average tax
rate progression (ARP), which is given by the difference between the marginal tax rate t
and the average tax rate t a , attARP -= . The tax system is progressive if ARP is
positive, and tax progression is increased if the difference increases (at a given income
level, see Lambert 2001, chapters 7 and 8). The term *d- att  indicates the marginal tax
revenue per worker when the gross wage increases. It can be decomposed such that we
have a tax progression effect and a tax level effect: )1( *d-+ atARP . The total effect is
non-positive for a linear tax system with 0=ARP  since 0)1( * £d-  but may eventually
become positive if the tax system is sufficiently progressive since the employment effect
is weighted by the average tax rate only. As we will see later on, the degree of tax
progression is decisive for how a revenue-neutral change in tax progression affects both
employment and individual effort.
5.1 Revenue neutral tax progression on the negotiated wage
The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t and a on the negotiated wage is
(20) dawdtwdw at += ,
with the partial derivatives derived in section 4. Substituting (19) into the RHS of (20) for
da  gives
(21) dw
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t
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and thus, the total effect of a revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax rate is
(22) 1*
0 )(1
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a
a
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dG
.
In what follows, we assume Laffer-efficiency in the sense that a higher wage tax
increases tax revenues while a higher tax exemption leads to lower tax revenues even
when we take account of the indirect effects via changes in w. With respect to the tax
exemption we then have
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Substituting the partial derivatives aw  from (17) and tw  from (18) into the numerator of
(22) shows that the numerator is unambiguously positive (see appendix C). Hence, we
have the following
Proposition 2 (wage moderation): A revenue-neutral increase in wage tax
progression will moderate the negotiated wage in the presence of individual
effort determination.
The interpretation is straightforward as it turns out that the numerator in equation (24)
denotes the compensated effect an increase of the tax rate has on the wage keeping the
Nash maximand value constant (see appendix D). The revenue-neutral increase in the tax
exemption fully offsets the income effect of the higher wage tax so that only the
substitution effect of this progression-enhancing tax reform remains. This finding shows
that the result from conventional ‘right-to-manage’ models in the absence of effort
considerations (see e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen 1996) also applies when we allow for
unobservable individual effort determination.
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5.2 Revenue neutral tax progression on individual effort determination
The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t and a and the negotiated wage on effort
determination is dwedaedtede wat ++= . Substituting the RHS of the tax-revenue
neutrality (19) for da  gives
(23)
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It is only the induced wage-moderation effect that affects individual effort decisions. The
term tea  measures the impact one additional Euro has on individual effort. A wage
reduction of one Euro reduces the net-of-tax wage by )1( t-  so that effort falls by
ttea )1( - . The wage-moderation effect also affects the amount by which the tax
exemption can be raised. It will be lower than the neutral effect of raising a  by
taw )( - if 0* <d- att . This always holds in a linear tax system but if the tax system
becomes very progressive, i.e. 01 * >d- at  individual effort eventually will fall. The case
is the more likely, the smaller the wage elasticity of labor demand and the average tax
burden are. If we assume a labor share of 2/3, we have 3=d , an average tax below 1/3
would suffice to let effort fall when progression rises. Formally, we have
(24) *
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A sufficient but not a necessary condition for individual effort to fall is 1<dt  since we
have d<d*  and tta < . These findings can be summarized in
Proposition 3 (individual effort determination): A revenue-neutral increase
in wage tax progression will lower individual effort if (i) the wage elasticity
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of labor demand and/or (ii) the marginal tax rate are sufficiently low. A
sufficient condition is 1<dt .
5.3 Revenue neutral tax progression and employment
Finally we consider the employment effect. The total effect of changes in the tax
parameters t and a and the negotiated wage on employment is dwLdaLdtLdL wat ++= .
Substituting the RHS of (19) for da  gives
(25)
( )
( )
.)1(
1)1(
1))(()1(
0
*
*
0
*
*
0
*
**
*
*
0
***
0
**
*
*
0
==
=
=
=
=
d
-
-d
=
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é d
-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ d-
-d
=
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ d-++
-
+
-d
=
dGdG
dG
a
a
dG
a
a
wat
dG
dt
dw
w
L
dt
de
e
L
dt
dw
w
Lett
te
L
dt
dwLtt
t
Le
t
awe
e
L
dt
dL
44 344 21
The first two terms cancel out since they cover the change in t  and a  that cet. par. would
leave the average tax burden and thus the net-of-tax wage constant. Hence, we are left
with two effects. As we have seen in section 5.2, the tax reform affects individual effort.
If – as is likely – effort decreases, labor productivity falls and cet. par. employment. On
the other side, the wage-moderating effect increases labor demand for any given effort
level. The total effect thus becomes ambiguous. From proposition 3 we can immediately
infer
Proposition 4 (rising employment): A sufficient but not necessary condition
that a revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will increase
employment is 1* ³dat .
Substituting the RHS of (23) for
0=dGdt
de in (25) we obtain
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From equation (25) it follows immediately that starting from a linear tax system,
employment will definitely rise. This leads to
Proposition 5 (rising employment): Introducing tax progression is good for
employment when wages are negotiated and effort is determined individually.
Although we have seen that different wage setting motives reinforces tax policy effects
on gross wages, this is not true anymore with respect to employment. With observable
and verifiable effort, employment is always decreasing when tax progression rises. When
effort is unobservable and not verifiable we find a countervailing effect via the adverse
effect a rise in tax progression has on individual effort.
6. Conclusions
We provide an extended framework to study the implications of imperfectly observable
individual effort of workers on the negotiated wage and the impact of a revenue-neutral
change in the wage tax progression on wage negotiations, effort and employment. The
first and most important result is that a higher degree of tax progression always leads to
wage moderation. Our model confirms this result for the case of observable effort and
wage bargaining as well as for the case where firms set efficiency wages unilaterally: the
different wage setting motives reinforce partial tax policy effects present in either model.
However, when effort is not observable and verifiable, the clear-cut effect well-known
from the wage bargaining literature that tax progression is good for employment does not
carry over to the case of imperfectly observable effort. In the general case, it remains true
that introducing tax progression is good for employment, but if the adverse effect on
effort becomes sufficiently large due to a too high degree of tax progression we cannot
20
rule out the case where employment falls as a consequence of a progressivity-enhancing
tax reform.
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Appendix A: the negotiated wage
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms ** ppw  and UUw  in the first-order
condition (13) determining the Nash bargaining solution. We start by looking at the profit
response by the firm to a change in the wage rate. The indirect profit function was
presented in equation (9). By applying the envelope theorem, according to which the
effect which take place through the labor demand vanish at the optimum, we find that
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from which follows that
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as .1<e  With respect to the trade union’s utility we find that
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Substituting (A4) and (A2) into (14) yields
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w .
This can be rewritten as:
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Using the definition of the total wage elasticity of labor demand *d  we obtain
(A7) [ ][ ])1)(1()(
)1(
')1)(1()1( * e--d+b-+=
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-
b+e--d- tabeg
tw
wegtw w .
(A8) [ ][ ])1)(1()(
)(
)1)(1()1( * e--d+b-+=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+q
b+e--d- tabeg
d
dtw .
Appendix B: comparative statics of the negotiated wage in terms of outside option,
wage tax and tax exemption
To see the effect, the parameters have on the mark-up, it is convenient to slightly change
notation:
N
d
d
M )1)(1(
)(
)1)(1(
)1)(1( e--d+b
=
+q
b+e--d
e--d+b
= .
The mark-up with respect to e  is:
(B1) 0
)(
)1(
2 >+q
q-db
=e dN
M .
The mark-up with respect to effort e is 0=eM . Condition (13) is an implicit function of
w . Thus the partial derivative with respect to e.g. a  is:
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First we have to sign the term in square brackets:
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Adding the first and third term in the square brackets yields
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With 0>D  it is straightforward to sign the first term in equation (16) because .0<ee aM
The second term in equation (16) is also positive since
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a .
In equation (19) we have
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which is positive if 0>- ab . QED.
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Appendix C: the sign of the numerator of (22)
Substituting the partial derivatives (17) and (18) into the numerator of (22) yields (using
(B4), (B5) and (4), (5), (13):
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Appendix D: the Slutzky-decomposition for the total effect of the wage tax on the
negotiated wage
Differentiating the indirect Nash maximand 01** W=p=W b-bU , where *sLU =  and
**** )1()( LswLef +-=p , with respect to t and a gives
(D1) (i) 0)(*1*11*1* <-pb-=pb=W b--bb--b awLUUU tt ,
(ii) 0*1*11*1* >pb=pb=W b--bb--b tLUUU aa .
The wage tax has a negative effect and tax exemption has a positive effect on the Nash
maximand. Using the comparative statics the indirect Nash maximand can be inverted in
terms of a  for the following function ),( 0W= tha . Substituting this for a in
01** VU =p=W b-b  gives the compensated indirect Nash maximand 00* )),(,( W=WW tht .3
Differentiating this compensated indirect Nash maximand with respect to t  gives
0** =W+W att h  so that tawh att /)(/
** -=WW-= . This describes the relationship of tax
parameters to keep the Nash maximand constant.
3   See e.g. Diamond and Yaari (1972).
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According to the duality theorem the Nash maximand wage function w , and the
compensated wage function, cw , at the same Nash maximand level are equal, so that we
have ),()),(,( 00 W=W twthtw c . Differentiating this with respect to the wage tax gives
c
tatt wwhw =+  so that we obtain the Slutsky equation
(D2) a
c
tt wt
awww )( --= ,
where the total effect of the wage tax rate has been decomposed into the negative
substitution effect ( 0<ctw , see Appendix C) and the positive income effect
÷
ø
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è
æ -- awt
aw )( . QED.
